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Abstract
The well-documented correlation between cigarette excise taxes and cigarette demand
may not be entirely causal if excise taxes reflect public sentiment towards smoking. I consider
whether proxies for smoking sentiment – the prevalence of smoking by education and intention
to quit statuses – are correlated with support for and implementation of tobacco control laws. I
find that cigarette excise taxes are most sensitive to the prevalence of educated smokers who do
not want to quit. Additionally, when proxies for public sentiment are included, the estimated
elasticity of cigarette demand declines from -2.0 to -1.3.
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Federal, state, and local governments have dramatically increased cigarette excise taxes
in recent years. From 1995 to 2001, the federal excise tax on cigarettes increased from 24 cents
to 34 cents per pack, and nineteen states nominally increased cigarette taxes by 31 cents per pack
on average. The popularity of cigarette excise taxes stems from their dual effects: they generate
tax revenue from smokers who remain smoking and encourage marginal smokers to quit. The
reduction in cigarette consumption in response to increased excise taxes is well documented: a
review of earlier studies suggests that the estimated price elasticity of cigarette demand ranges
from -.14 to -1.23 (see Chaloupka and Warner, 2000, for a review), and may have increased to 2.1 in recent years (Goolsbee and Slemrod, 2004). As a result, cigarette excise taxes are now an
integral component of public policies to curb smoking.
The documented relationship between excise taxes and cigarette consumption may not be
entirely causal, however. An important concern, and an often unaddressed issue in the
literature, is the extent to which tobacco control policies reflects public sentiment towards
smoking. If public sentiment towards smoking affects the prevalence of smoking and is also
correlated with tobacco control policy, then the implied effect of tobacco control policies on the
prevalence of smoking, without controlling for public sentiment, may be overstated (Wasserman
et al. in particular, 1991; and Besley and Case, 2000, more generally). If this were the case, then
policies that change public sentiment towards smoking, such as health education, may be more
effective at reducing smoking rates than tobacco control policies alone.1 Therefore, to design
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Tobacco control policies may be used to correct naïve assumptions about the health risks posed
by smoking, serving as a substitute for health education (Viscusi, 1990), so the implementation
of tobacco taxes may ultimately impact public sentiment towards smoking. Evans and Farrelly
(1998), however, find that some smokers switch from lower to higher strength cigarettes in
response to excise taxes to attenuate the effect of decreased cigarette consumption on actual tar
and nicotine intake. Thus, for some individuals, cigarette taxes are not a perfect substitute for
education about the health risks posed by smoking.
1

and implement effective policies to reduce cigarette consumption, it is important to isolate the
causal effect of cigarette excise taxes on smoking.
In this study, I develop several proxies for public sentiment towards smoking and
examine the correlation between these proxies and changes in federal and state excise taxes on
cigarettes. The most straightforward proxy for public sentiment is the prevalence of smoking:
smokers are less averse to smoking than non smokers. I then disaggregate the prevalence of
smoking along two dimensions: the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit and the prevalence
of educated smokers. Smokers who plan to quit evidently disparage smoking more than smokers
who do not want to quit. And the health behaviors of those with higher socioeconomic status,
measured by education attainment, may serve as a leading indicator for public sentiment towards
smoking. Therefore, the prevalence of smoking by intention to quit and education attainment
arguably serve as better proxies for public sentiment towards smoking than the rate of smoking
alone.
I first examine whether smoking status and, among smokers, the intention to quit is
correlated with explicit support for a particular tobacco control policy: smoking bans in public
places. The data come from the 1995 and 1996 Tobacco Supplements of the CPS. First, I find
that non smokers favor smoking bans more than smokers, and smokers who plan to quit favor
smoking bans more than smokers who do not plan to quit. If the differential support for public
smoking bans reflects one’s attitude towards smoking, then the prevalence of smoking by
intention to quit status arguably serve as proxies for public sentiment towards smoking.
I then examine the correlation between proxies for public sentiment and changes in
federal and state excise tax increases between 1995 and 2001. Over this time period, nineteen
states nominally increased their state excise taxes (state excise tax rates in 1995 and 2001 are
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presented in Appendix Table). The results indicate that states are less likely to increase excise
taxes, and increase them by less, as the prevalence of smoking increases. Furthermore, the
negative correlation between taxes and the rate of smoking is driven almost entirely by the
prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit. If the prevalence of educated smokers
who do not plan to quit serves as an adequate proxy for changing public sentiment towards
smoking, then the results suggest that tobacco control policies are indeed correlated with public
sentiment.
Finally, I estimate the effect of cigarette excise taxes on the demand for cigarettes with
and without controlling for public sentiment. The empirical strategy consists of regressing statelevel changes in cigarette consumption between 1995 and 2001 on the change in the price of
cigarettes over the same time period. To isolate variation in prices due to excise tax increases, I
instrument the change in the price of cigarettes with the change in price due to federal and state
excise tax increases. However, if changes in excise taxes are endogenous and correlated with
public sentiment towards smoking, then the causal effect of taxes on smoking may be overstated.
Without controls for baseline sentiment, I find that the elasticity of cigarette demand is -2.0 and
the elasticity of the smoking rate is -.48. When baseline proxies for public sentiment are
included, the estimated elasticity of cigarette demand and the elasticity of the smoking rate
decline to -1.27 and -.09, respectively. Thus, it appears that the causal effect of excise taxes on
smoking is potentially overstated when public sentiment is not controlled.
There are numerous studies that examine the elasticity of cigarette demand to excise tax
changes, but to my knowledge, only Ohsfeldt et al. (1999) explicitly address the potential
endogeneity of cigarette excise taxes. In contrast to the results of this study, they find that the
elasticity of cigarette demand actually increases when public sentiment is addressed. However,
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their empirical strategy is fundamentally different from the strategy considered here. Instead of
using proxy variables to control for public sentiment, they use instruments for cigarette excise
taxes based on government characteristics in an attempt to purge the effect of public sentiment
on cigarette prices altogether.2 But it is not obvious – nor do the authors clarify – what type of
variation in cigarette prices these instruments isolate and therefore the extent to which this
variation is exogeneous. Rather than using questionable instrumental variables to purge the
effect of public sentiment from excise taxes, I attempt to directly control for public sentiment by
using proxy variables.

I. Methodology and Data
A. Methodology
The empirical objective is to evaluate the extent to which tobacco control policy reflects
public sentiment towards smoking. I first evaluate two proxies for public sentiment: smoking
status and, among smokers, the intention to quit smoking. Naturally, smokers are less averse to
smoking than non smokers, and smokers who want to quit disparage smoking more than smokers
who do not want to quit. I first evaluate the correlation between smoking and intention to quit
statuses with explicit support for public smoking bans. If smoking and intention to quit statuses
are strongly correlated with support for smoking bans, and those who support smoking bans
disparage smoking more than those who do not, then smoking prevalence and the prevalence of
smokers who intend to quit may serve as proxies for smoking sentiment.
I then examine whether proxies for public sentiment towards smoking are correlated with
recent increases in federal and state excise taxes on tobacco. If state excise taxes reflect public

2

The instruments include per-capita government expenditures, state political liberalism,
and an index of interparty competition
4

attitudes towards smoking, and smoking status serves as a proxy for smoking sentiment, then
increases in excise taxes should be negatively correlated with the prevalence of smoking. The
empirical specification is given by,
(1) Δ log(Tn ) = α 0 + α1S n + α 2 X n + ε 1, n ,
where Δ log(Tn ) is some measure of the change in state excise taxes in state n , and S n is the
baseline smoking rate in state n . The vector X n is a set of state-specific characteristics, and ε1,n
is an error term. The alternative hypothesis - the likelihood or magnitude of an excise tax
increase is negatively associated with the prevalence smoking - is α1 < 0.
As mentioned, the correlation between excise tax changes and the smoking rate may
depend differentially on the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit. The empirical
specification, with the smoking rate disaggregated by intention to quit status, is given by,
(2)

Δ log(T ) = β 0 + β1S q + β 2 S q + β 3 X n + ε 2 ,

where S q and S q ( S = S q + S q ) are the prevalence of smokers who plan to quit and do not plan to
quit, respectively (state subscripts n are suppressed). If the prevalence of smokers who do not
plan to quit serves as a better proxy for public sentiment towards smoking than smoking
prevalence alone, then the negative correlation between tax increases and the prevalence of
smoking should be greater with respect to the prevalence of smokers who do not want to quit:

β1 > β 2 .
In addition to the intention to quit, the negative correlation between excise taxes and the
rate of smoking may depend differentially on the proportion of educated smokers. Previous
research has shown that the historical decline in cigarette consumption in the US and in other
countries is concentrated among the more educated (Pierce, 1989; Escobedo and Peddicord,
1996; Osler et al, 1998). And second, previous economic research on signaling demonstrates
5

that the higher end of the socioeconomic strata sets trends for certain behaviors; for example,
popular fashion (Pesendorfer, 1995) and first names (Levitt and Fryer, 2004). In the context of
smoking, higher educated individual may choose not to smoke - and openly disparage smoking to signal their social status. Cigarette smoking would then be considered unfashionable, and
lower ends of the social strata would eventually adopt a negative sentiment towards smoking.
Thus, the health behaviors of the more educated plausibly serves as a proxy for public health
sentiment towards smoking and a leading indicator for changes in smoking prevalence. The
empirical specification, with the prevalence of smoking disaggregated by education attainment,
is given by,
(3)
where S e and S e

Δ log(T ) = γ 0 + γ 1Se + γ 2 S e + γ 3 X n + ε 3 ,

( S = Se + Se ) are the prevalence of smoking of more educated and less

educated individuals, respectively. If the prevalence of smoking among the more educated
serves as a better proxy for public health sentiment than the prevalence among the less educated,
and tax increases reflect public sentiment towards smoking, then γ 1 > γ 2 .
If the cigarette taxes reflect public sentiment towards smoking, and the prevalence of
smokers by education and the intention to quit serve as better proxies for public sentiment than
smoking rates alone, then state tax increases should be most sensitive to the prevalence of
educated smokers who do not plan to quit. A more general function disaggregates smoking rates
by both educational attainment and intention to quit status,
(4)

Δ log(T ) = λ0 + λ1S qe + λ2 S qe + λ3 S qe + λ4 S qe + λ5 X n + ε 4 .

If the prevalence of educated smokers who do not plan to quit serves as the best proxy among the
other prevalence measures, then much of the negative correlation between tax increases and
smoking prevalence should be driven by the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to
6

quit. Therefore, λ3 should be greater in absolute value than the coefficients associated with the
other prevalence measures.
The negative correlation between cigarette demand and cigarette taxes is well
documented; but if public sentiment towards smoking affects the prevalence of smoking and is
correlated with excise taxes, then the negative correlation between cigarette consumption and
excise taxes may not be entirely causal. Therefore, I examine whether the elasticity of cigarette
demand and smoking rates to price are sensitive to the inclusion of proxies for smoking
sentiment. The specification for estimating the elasticity of cigarette demand is derived by firstdifferencing two, presumably equilibrium, outcomes at the state level,
(5)

Δ log( D) = π 0 + π 1Δ log( P ) + υ .

To isolate variation in price changes due to excise taxes, i.e. the component of cigarette prices
affected by policy, the change in price is instrumented with the predicted change in price due to
excise tax changes: Δ log(T ) = log(ΔT + P0 ) − log( P0 ) , where P0 is the baseline price of cigarettes
and ΔT is the level change in excise taxes on cigarettes.
If sentiment towards smoking affects the demand for cigarettes through υ , and sentiment
is correlated with excise tax changes Δ log(T ) , then the instrument and the structural error term
in equation (5) are positively correlated. Thus, the structural effect of price on cigarette demand,

π1 , is biased upwards. To address this concern, I include proxies for public sentiment in
equation (5),
(6)

Δ log( D ) = η0 + η1Δ log( P ) + η 2 S qe + η3 S qe + η 4 S qe + η5 S qe + θ .

7

In this equation, the structural error term in equation (5) is effectively disaggregated by public
sentiment and a residual error term: υ = η 2 S qe + η3 S qe + η 4 S qe + η5 S qe + θ . If θ is now
uncorrelated with excise tax changes Δ log(T ) , π 1 is consistently estimated.

B. Recent Changes in Federal and State Excise Taxes on Cigarettes
Federal and state excise taxes have increased dramatically in recent years. From 1995 to
2001, the federal excise tax on cigarettes increased from 24 cents to 34 cents per pack, and
nineteen states nominally increased cigarette taxes by 31 cents per pack on average. In 1995,
only seven states had combined (federal and state) cigarette excise taxes in excess of 75 cents per
pack, and no state had combined cigarette excise taxes in excess of one dollar (combined excise
taxes by state are presented in the Appendix Table). By 2001, sixteen states had combined
excise taxes in excess of 75 cents per pack (in 1995 values), and five states had combined excise
taxes that exceeded one dollar. There was also a wave of excise tax increases between 2001 and
2003: 25 states nominally increased state excise taxes and, by 2003, 18 states had combined state
and federal excise taxes (in 1995 values) in excess of one dollar.
For two related reasons, I focus on federal and state excise tax increases between 1995
and 2001 rather than the wave of state tax hikes between 2001 and 2003. First, Goolsbee and
Slemrod (2004) estimate an increased price elasticity of cigarette demand during the 1990s
relative to estimates from earlier periods.3 And second, the state tax increases between 2001 and
2003 were largely in response to state-level budget deficits; so much of the variation in excise
tax increases over this time period potentially reflects the severity of state budgetary issues rather

3

In their study, they examine the extent to which to which increased use of the internet affects
cross-state sales of cigarettes and conclude that the estimated price elasticity of cigarette demand
is sensitive to internet-usage across states.
8

than public sentiment towards smoking. Ostensibly, the goal of excise tax increases between
1995 and 2001 - when the US economy was expanding and government budgets were shrinking
– was to reduce cigarette consumption and therefore are more likely to reflect public sentiment
towards smoking. Thus, this study considers the extent to which a correlation between public
sentiment and excise tax increases affects the estimated price elasticity of cigarette demand
between 1995 and 2001.
C. Data
The main data for the empirical analysis come from the Tobacco Supplements from the
Current Population Survey. Supplements in certain years contain smoking status, intentions to
quit (among smokers), former smoking status (among non smokers), and sentiment towards
smoking bans in certain public places. To examine explicit support for smoking bans by
smoking status, I pool CPS supplements in September 1995, January 1996, and May 1996.
Because proxy respondents are more likely to misreport smoking status and intentions to quit
compared to non proxy respondents, I only consider non proxy survey responses.4 I also focus
on civilian adults. There are 193,808 observations that satisfy these criteria.
The pooled CPS data are also used to estimate state-level smoking prevalence measures,
by intention to quit status and educational attainment, and state-specific characteristics for
equations (1) through (4). Survey population weights are used to calculate state-level averages.
The outcome variable in estimation equations (1) through (4) is constructed using information on
federal and state excise taxes, compiled from data provided by the Tax Policy Center of the
Urban Institute and Brookings Institution; and cigarette prices, which are obtained from the Tax
Burden on Tobacco (Orzechowski and Walker, 2003). These data are presented by state in the
4

Ohsfeldt et al. (1997) demonstrate systemic underreporting of smoking by proxy respondents
relative to respondents.
9

Appendix Table. The outcome variable is defined as the change in taxes from 1995 to 2001
relative to the average price of cigarettes (generic cigarettes included) in 1995 at the state level,
Δ log(T ) = log(T2001 − T1995 + P1995 ) − log( P1995 ) ,
where T represents federal and state excise taxes.5
For equations (5) and (6), I use the same smoking prevalence measures used in equations
(1) through (4), and I consider two different outcome variables: cigarette demand and the
smoking rate. The change in cigarette demand is measured as the change in per-capita tobacco
sales, obtained from the Tax Burden on Tobacco, between 1995 and 2001 (data are also included
in the Appendix Table). The change in smoking rate is estimated using the CPS Tobacco
Supplements in 1995 and 1996 and in 2001 and 2002 (June 2001, November 2001, and February
2002).

II. Sentiment by Smoking Status: Smoking Bans
I first examine whether smoking status and intention to quit status are correlated with
explicit support for a particular tobacco control policy; smoking bans in certain public places.
The proportions of individuals who favor smoking bans by smoking status and public place are
presented in Table 1. Panels A and B refer to non smokers and smokers, respectively, and the
columns correspond to the public space. Across all spaces, non smokers favor smoking bans
more than smokers. The order from most supported to least supported among smokers and non
smokers alike is as follows; hospitals, sporting venues, work, shopping malls, restaurants, and
bars. The largest difference in support between smokers and non smokers is in restaurants
(56.9% versus 18.6%) and hospitals (83.2% versus 59.2%). Thus, the data suggest that the
5

The estimation equations (1) through (6) are estimated at the state level, so excise taxes at the
local level are not incorporated in the analysis.
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sentiment towards smoking, and explicit support for tobacco control policies, depends on
smoking status.
In panel B, I disaggregate smokers by intention to quit status according to their response
to a particular Tobacco Supplement question: “Are you seriously considering stopping within the
next sixth months?” The sample size of smokers is reduced from 44,322 to 42,885 due to missing
responses to the intention to quit question. As indicated, smokers who plan to quit support
smoking bans in all spaces relative to those who do not plan to quit, suggesting that smokers who
intend to quit disparage smoking more than smokers who do not plan to quit. Additionally, the
smallest differences in support between these two groups are smoking bans in restaurants (27.3%
versus 12.9%) and bars (8.9% versus 5.1%); two places commonly associated with smoking.
One interpretation is that smokers who plan to quit view smoking bans as a self-control device to
aid them in their attempt to quit (Gruber, 2001), and therefore favor bans more than those who
do not plan to quit. 6 However, they may also hedge against an unsuccessful attempt at quitting
by supporting bans relatively less in restaurants and bars.
I next examine differential support for bans among non smokers by whether they are
former smokers (panel A of Table 1) and by whether they quit within the past year. As
indicated, those who never smoked prefer smoking bans more than former smokers in all public
spaces, and the difference in support is even greater when never smokers are compared to former
smokers who recently quit. Consistent with the results in Panel B, the difference in support
between never smokers and former smokers who recently quit is largest in restaurants (56.9%
versus 32%) and bars (31.6% and 12.0%), which in this case may reflect hedging behavior
among former smokers against smoking relapse.
6

Gruber and Mullainathan (2002) find that cigarette excise taxes make predicted smokers
happier, suggesting that smokers view tobacco control policies as a self-control device.
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Smoking status may be correlated with other factors that may affect sentiment towards
smoking and therefore support for smoking bans. Therefore, I estimate first-difference models
of support while simultaneously controlling for certain observable characteristics: age (linearly),
sex (male and female), marital status (married and not married), educational attainment (high
school or less and some college or more), race (white and non white), and labor force
participation (participating and no participating). The first-differences estimators as estimated
from two different samples: non smokers, by former smoking status, and current smokers, by
intention to quit status.
The estimates from the first-difference, linear probability models are presented in Table
2. Estimates among non smokers are presented in panel A (the left out group is former smokers)
and estimates among smokers are presented in panel B (the left out group is smokers who do not
plan to quit). Within each panel, estimates with and without controls are given in rows I and II,
respectively. As indicated, the differential support for smoking bans among the two sets of
groups is robust to the inclusion of observable characteristics. Furthermore, the largest
difference in support for bans among non smokers by former smoking status, and smallest
difference in support for bans among smokers by intention to quit status, is in restaurants and
bars. All estimated differences are also robust to the inclusion of certain observable
characteristics.

III. Sentiment and Public Policy: Cigarette Excise Taxes
A. Summary of Data
I next consider whether proxies for smoking sentiment are correlated with increases in
cigarette excise taxes. The data for the analysis are summarized in Table 3. The variables are
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grouped by row, and the columns correspond to different samples of states according to the log
change in federal and state excise taxes between 1995 and 2001 (relative to the average price of
cigarettes by state in 1995). The first column contains all states, column II is states with
relatively smaller changes in excise taxes (<.075), and column III is states with relatively larger
changes (>.075). State observations are weighted with respect to state size, and standard errors
reflect that state-level averages are calculated from micro-level data.
The first set of variables corresponds to the change in cigarette variables between 1995
and 2001. On average, excise taxes increased by approximately 5.7% between 1995 and 2001
relative to the price of cigarettes in 1995; and the average price of cigarettes increased by
approximately 46.9% over the same time period. By comparing the second and third columns,
increases in state excise taxes are correlated with changes in the average price of cigarettes. A
regression of the change in prices on the change in taxes, controlling for state-average
demographic characteristics, yields a point estimate on the change in taxes of .68 (standard error:
.10) and an F-statistic of 13.4. Furthermore, states with larger increases in state excise taxes
exhibited relatively larger declines in per capita cigarette sales and smoking rates. Figure 1 plots
the change in log per capita cigarette sales against the change in log excise tax price and
illustrates a negative correlation between state excise taxes and cigarette demand.
The second set of variables corresponds to smoking prevalence by intention to quit and
education attainment. Individuals are separated into two groups according to education
attainment: less educated, defined as high school or less, and more educated, defined as some
college and more. Indicated in the first column, the smoking prevalence of the less educated is
greater than the prevalence of the more educated: 13.1% versus 8.4%. The differential
prevalence of smoking by education attainment does not result from a higher prevalence of less
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educated individuals: in the final panel of Table 3, the sample is almost evenly split between less
and higher educated individuals. The data also indicate that the proportion of educated smokers
who want to quit is greater than the proportion of educated smokers who do not, whereas the
opposite is true among less educated smokers. Because more educated individual are less likely
to smoke, and a larger proportion of educated smokers would like to quit, the prevalence of
smoking among the more educated by intention to quit status may serve as a leading indicator for
public sentiment towards smoking.
When states are separated by smaller versus greater excise tax increases, two
relationships become apparent. First, states with smaller excise tax increases have slightly
higher rates of smoking: 23.5% versus 20.0%. In Figure 2, I plot the change in log excise taxes
from 1995 and 2001 against the prevalence of smoking in 1995. The figure illustrates that much
of the excise tax increases occurred in states with relatively lower rates of smoking. And second,
in states with relatively smaller excise tax increases, the proportion of educated smoker who do
not want to quit is greater than the proportion of educated smokers who do plan to quit.
However, in states with relatively larger excise tax increases, the educated smoker population is
split evenly between those who want to quit and those who do not. Thus, it appears that excise
tax increases are correlated with the prevalence of smoking, particularly the prevalence of
smoking and intention to quit among the more educated.
The final panel of Table 3 contains demographic characteristics; average age, percent
male, percent married, percent who are higher educated, percent non white, and percent of
individuals who are not participation in the labor force. As indicated, only the prevalence of
more educated individuals varies considerably between states with larger versus smaller
increases in excise taxes: 46.0% versus 51.3%. Nonetheless, I control for state-level
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demographics when estimating the correlation between changes in excise taxes and proxies for
smoking sentiment.
B. Estimation Results
Estimates of equations (1) through (4) are presented in Table 4. In panel I, the outcome
variable is binary, equaling one if the log change in excise taxes – between 1995 and 2001
relative to the average cigarette price in 1995 - is greater than .075 and zero otherwise. In panel
II, the outcome variable is the actual log change in excise taxes relative to the average cigarette
price in 1995.
I first estimate the likelihood and magnitude of excise tax increases with respect to
changes in the rate of smoking – equation (1) above. As indicated in columns (1), states are less
likely to increase cigarette taxes, and increase them by less, as the prevalence of smoking
increases: a one percent increase in the smoking rate is associated with a .09 percent decline in
the probability of increasing excise taxes and a .01 percent decline in the actual change in excise
taxes.
I then disaggregate smoking prevalence by intention to quit – equation (2) above. Again,
if the prevalence of smokers who intend to quit is a better proxy for public sentiment towards
smoking than the prevalence of smoking alone, then much of the negative correlation between
excise taxes increases and the prevalence of smoking should be driven primarily by the
prevalence of smokers who do not want to quit. The results, in columns (2), confirm this
contention. A one percent increase in the prevalence of smokers who do not intend to quit is
associated with a .1 percent decline in the likelihood of an excise tax increase – the coefficient on
the prevalence of smokers is -.05 and statistically insignificant.
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I then disaggregate the smoking rate by educational attainment – equation (3) above. If
the smoking rate among the more educated is a better proxy for public sentiment towards
smoking, then much of the negative correlation between smoking prevalence and excise taxes
should be driven by the prevalence of educated smokers. The results, presented in columns (3),
suggest that this is indeed the case: a one percent increase in the prevalence of educated smokers
is associated with a .18 percent decline in the likelihood of an excise tax increase. In contrast,
the partial correlation between state excise tax increases and the prevalence of less educated
smokers is nearly zero and statistically insignificant. The heterogeneous effect of smoking
prevalence by educational attainment also holds for actual changes in excise taxes, presented in
panel II.
Finally, I disaggregate the smoking prevalence by both educational attainment and
intention to quit status – equation (4) above. Based on previous arguments, the prevalence of
educated smokers who do not want to quit is arguably the best proxy for public sentiment
towards smoking among those considered, so the partial correlation between excise taxes and
this prevalence measure should be greatest compared to other prevalence measures. As indicated
in column (4) of both panels, much of the negative correlation between excise taxes and smoking
prevalence is driven by the prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit. Taken
together, the results suggest that public sentiment towards smoking is indeed correlated with
tobacco control policies.

IV. Price Elasticity of Cigarette Demand
If public sentiment towards smoking affects changes in the rate of smoking and is also
correlated with tobacco control policies, then the effect of tobacco control policies on smoking
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may be overstated. Therefore, I estimate the elasticity of cigarette demand and smoking
prevalence with respect to the total price of cigarettes with and without the inclusion of proxies
for public sentiment. The specification equation, given in equations (5) and (6) above, consists
of regressing the change in cigarette demand or the prevalence of smoking on the change in the
average price of cigarettes by state. To isolate the effect of excise tax policy on cigarette prices,
the actual change in the average price of cigarettes within a state is instrumented with the change
in federal and state excise taxes relative to the state-average price of cigarettes in 1995.
The elasticity estimates are presented in Table 5. The panels correspond to different
outcome variables: panel I is per-capita tobacco sales, panel II is the rate of smoking, and panels
III and IV correspond to the unconditional rate of smoking among the more educated and less
educated, respectively. In each panel, the first column gives the estimated elasticity without
including baseline proxies for smoking sentiment, and the second column reflects the estimated
elasticity controlling for baseline proxies for smoking sentiment.
As indicated in panel I, the price elasticity of cigarette demand is -2.0 and statistically
significant. Similar to the findings of Goolsebee and Slemrod (2004), the estimated elasticity
during the 1990s is high relative to previous years. However, the estimated elasticity declines to
-1.27 when the proxies for public sentiment are included, which suggests that the effect of taxes
on cigarette demand is overstated when public sentiment is not controlled.
The estimated elasticity of the smoking rate with respect to price also declines when
proxies for public sentiment are included, indicated in panel II. Without controlling for
sentiment, the elasticity of the smoking rate is -.48, but declines to -.09 when baseline proxies for
smoking sentiment are included, though neither estimate is statistically significant.
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The results in panels III and IV, which contains elasticity estimates of the smoking rate
by education attainment status, suggests that the rate of smoking among the less educated is more
responsive to price than the rate of smoking among the more educated, -.708 versus -.405, which
is consistent with previous studies in the literature (Townsend et al., 1994). However, the
elasticity estimates for the less educated declines in magnitude, and the elasticity among the
more educated reverses sign, when baseline proxies for sentiment are included.

V. Conclusion
In this study, I examine whether proxies for public sentiment towards smoking are
correlated with explicit support for tobacco control policies and subsequent changes in tobacco
control laws. The rate of smoking naturally serves as a proxy for public sentiment towards
smoking, but I also disaggregate the prevalence of smoking by education attainment and
intention to quit status. The prevalence of educated smokers who do not want to quit is perhaps
the best proxy for public sentiment towards smoking and consequently changes in cigarette
demand. The results indicate that there is negative correlation between excise tax increases and
the prevalence of smoking, which is driven primarily by the prevalence of educated smokers who
do not want to quit. Thus, it appears that public sentiment towards smoking is an important
factor for whether and to what extent tobacco control policies are implemented.
If tobacco control policies such as cigarette excise taxes and smoking bans are correlated
with public sentiment towards smoking, and smoking sentiment affects future demand for
cigarettes, then the causal effect of tobacco control policies on cigarette demand may be
overstated. I find that when the proxies for public sentiment are controlled, the estimated price
elasticity of cigarette demand declines by approximately 38% (from -2.0 to -1.3) and the
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elasticity of the rate of smoking declines by 81% (from -.481 to .092). Thus, it appears that the
decline in cigarette consumption and increase in excise taxes reflects, to a certain extent, public
sentiment towards smoking.
If reducing the rate of smoking is a prescribed policy goal, the results presented here
suggest that public sentiment and tobacco control policies move in tandem. Therefore, to reduce
the prevalence of smoking, cigarette excise taxes may not be a perfect substitute for policies that
change public sentiment, and are more realistically a complement health education.
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